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VOLUME XX

JUNE, 1935

NUMBER 4

THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK: ITS ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, PROGRAM AND ACCOMPLISHMENT
JOHN W.

MACDONALD

SIMON ROSENZWEIG

I
ORGANIZATION AND WORK

The Law Revision Commission of the State of New York has been
characterized as "a pioneer juristic venture".' Created by Chapter 597
of the Laws of 1934, the Commission was charged with the following
duties:
") To examine the common law and statutes of the state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and
anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms.
"2) To receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended by the American Law Institute, the commissioners for the
promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States, any bar
association, or other learned bodies.

"3) To receive and consider suggestions from judges, justices, public officials, lawyers, and the public generally as to defects and anachronisms in the law.

"4) To recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it

deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable

rules of law, and to bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into
harmony with modem conditions.
"s5) To report its proceedings annually to the legislature on or before February first, and, if it deems advisable, to accompany its report with proposed bills to carry out any of its recommendations."
The statute creating the commission was the result of a proposal by
the Commission on the Administration of Justice, 2 which in its 1934
report to the Legislature wrote: 3
'Laube, Book Review (1935)

20 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 403.

2This commission was created by the legislature "to investigate and collect
facts relating to the present administration of justice in the state" by L. 1931, c.
186; continued by L. 1932, c. 5o8; L. 1933, C.28, 261; L. 1934, C.29; L. 1935,
c. 58. See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1934) No. 5o. See also editorials N. Y. L. J. Dec. 14,
15, 1934 at 2372, 2398.
3N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I934) No. 50, p. 57.
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"Assuming that all our present problems are quickly solved
it is certain that new problems will arise from time to time which
will be just as pressing as those which now beset us. To the orderly examination of both types, our proposals for a Judicial Council
and for a Law Revision Commission are admirably adapted. We
commend these devices to the Legislature in the belief that if
they are adopted, maladjustments in the administration of
justice and in our system of law generally, will henceforth be
far less likely to reach the critical state."
The genealogy of the Law Revision Commission has already been
the subject of discussion. 4 The concern of the present article is not the
history of the proposals leading up to the creation of the Commission. Our purpose is to trace the development of the work of the Law
Revision Commission since its organization, and to discuss the accomplishments of the Commission during its first legislative year.
The Commission has been set up as part of the legislative branch of
the government. 6 As an advisor to the Legislature, the Commission
must investigate the New York law to discover inequitable and
anachronistic rules. It has had the advantage of having as ex officio
members the chairmen of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and
Assembly, who have effectively sponsored its proposals in committee
and on the floor. The members of the Legislature have given careful
consideration to the recommendations and studies put at their disposal by the Commission and have, on the whole, shown approval
of the Commission's work.
The Commission has centralized its research activities at its headquarters under the supervision of its director of research. When a
problem is undertaken for study, it is assigned as a project to a subcommittee of the Commission. Upon completion of a project, the subcommittee reports to the Commission. After consideration and final
action, the subcommittee is discharged.
An important standing committee, created to receive and consider
suggestions for future study, is the committee on projects. Nearly two
hundred suggestions for reform in the New York law have been received from judges, lawyers, public officials, interested groups, and
laymen. 7 Members of law faculties, the reporters and annotators of
the American Law Institute, and the Commissioners on Uniform
4

See (1934) 20 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 1i9; (1935) 4 FoRDHA L. REV. 102.
Particularly important is the article: Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921)
35 HARV. L. REV. 113.
6
L. 1934, C. 597; N. Y. LEGISLATIVE LAW, Article 4a, §§ 70-72.
7
N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. 8. Since the date of this report, February
1, 1935, the number of suggestions has almost doubled.
5
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State Laws have also suggested projects. 8 The Commission itself has
undertaken several exploratory studies from which fruitful projects
have resulted. 9 A thorough examination of the reports of the New
York courts is in progress to disclose opinions in which courts have
adhered to precedent reluctantly. 0 As the Commission itself has
written:"
"The Commission is examining the case law of the State in
search of judicial evidence as to defects and anachronisms. A
survey of the working of existing rules of law is an essential
part of its program as a continuing body serving the Legislature
in an advisory capacity. There are many situations where the
administration of justice is impeded by the existence of laws ill
fitted to modern conditions, causing a discontent, which often
has no organ for its expression. The Commission is not only responsive to suggestions which are brought to its attention but
is setting itself the task of studying the needs which have not
yet become articulate."
The Commission organized in the summer of 1934 .12 By early fall, a
research staff had been set up, and a program of research undertaken.
In February, 1935, thirteen bills" were ready for introduction into
8

N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, pp. 8-9.
N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. IS. This is directed by N. Y. LEGISLATIVE
LAw § 72 (1).
'ON. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. 8. The report of the Commission states:
"Chief Judge Pound of the Court of Appeals suggested an examination of the
9

recent Court of Appeals reports during the last quarter century for the purpose of
discovering cases in which the Court exhibited a reluctance to follow the precedent." See CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PROCESS (1921) Lecture IV,
Adherence to Precedent; Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 HARV. L. REV.
113, 117 et seg.
'N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. 15.

"The Governor appointed the members of the Commission on July 6, 1934.
See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. I.
"(1935) Sen. Int. No. 1237, Pr. No. I4OO, Ass. Int. No. 1585, Pr. No. 1731;
(1935) Sen. Int. No. 1236, Pr. No. 1399, Ass. Int. No. 1584, Pr. No. 1730; (1935)
Sen. Int. No. 1429, Pr. No. 164o, Ass. Int. No. 1912, Pr. No. 2131; (1935) Sen.
Int. No. 1238, Pr. No. 14O1, Ass. Int. No. 1586, Pr. No. 1732; (1935) Sen. Int.
No. 1423, Pr. No. 1634, Ass. Int. No. 1878, Pr. No. 2o89; (1935) Sen. Int. No.
1422, Pr. No. 1633, Ass. Int. No. 1879, Pr. No. 2090, 2759; (1935) Sen. Int.
No. 1439, Pr. No. 1641, Ass. Int. No. 1915, Pr. No. 2134; (935) Sen. Int. No.
1598, Pr. No. 1868, Ass. Int. No. 2514, Pr. No. 2177; (1935) Sen. Int. No. z425,
Pr. No. 1636, Ass. Int. No. 1914, Pr. No. 2133; (935) Sen. Int. No. 1428, Pr.
No. 1639, Ass. Int. No. 191o, Pr. No. 2129; (935) Sen. Int. No. 1427, Pr. No.
1638, Ass. Int. No. 1913, Pr. No. 2132; (1935) Sen. Int. No. 1426, Pr. No. 1637,
Ass. Int. No. 1911, Pr. No. 2130; (1935) Sen. Int. No. 1539, Pr. No. 1771, Ass.
Int. No. igo9, Pr. No. 2128.
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the Legislature. Of these, eleven passed both houses, 4 and all thirteen
passed the Senate. In three instances, the study of the Commission
disclosed situations which the Commission felt required no change in
the New York law at this time.15 The Commission also made three important recommendations directly to the Governor at his request. 6
To facilitate its work, the Commission has adopted the medium of a
calendar, the following formula being used:
x. Imrnzdiate study. Projects being studied by the Commission;
Subjects suggested to the Commission
2. Preferredlist.
which are thought suitable for future
study;
Subjects suggested to the Commission on
3. Reserved list.
which no action7 negative or affirmative
has been taken.'
In accordance with this formula immediate study was begun on the
following projects:"s
i. Contribution between joint tort feasors.
2. Survival of tort actions after the death of plaintiff or defendant.
3. Expert witnesses.
4. Statutes of Limitations.

5. Revision of the Penal Law.
6. The commutation-compensation provisions of the Correction Law.
7. Law relating to perjury.
8. Law of contracts relating to consideration and the effect of
the seal.
9. Liability of tort feasors for injuries to unborn children.
io. Imputation of a parent's or custodian's contributory negligence to an infant plaintiff.
ii. Amendments to the Sales Act proposed by the Comnuissioners on Uniform State Laws relating to the negotiability of documents of title.
12. Definition of "value" in the Sales Act and Bills of Lading
Act.
13. Method of valuation of a widow's share of realty under
section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law.
14All except (1935) Sen. Int. No. 143o, Pr. No. 1641, Ass. Int. No. 1915, Pr.
No. 2134; and (1935) Sen. Int. No. 1426, Pr. No. 1637, Ass. Int. No. 1911, Pr. No.
213o. These two bills passed the Senate.
5
See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 60 (G), pp. 87-1o4 and N. Y. LEG. Doc.
(1935) No. 60 (J). Infra notes II4-n8.
'lnfra notes 125-133.
"7N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. io.
"8N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, pp. io-n, which contains a list of projects
on the "immediate study" calendar as of the date of that report; subjects numbered 16 and 17 in the list were undertaken after the submission of the first annual
report.
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14. Criminal extradition.

15. Six projects in the law of real property dealing with:
a. Power of a life tenant or trustee to sell, mortgage, or
lease a fee.
b. Statute allowing treble damages for waste.
c. Doctrine of incorporation by reference in the law of
wills.
d. Implication of cross remainders in conveyances by will
and by deed.
e. A procedure for the recovery of damages to realty in
which there are possessory interests and future interests.
f. Ability of the owner of a present possessory interest to
"change" the premises against the objection of an
owner of a future interest.
i6. The proposed amendments to section 722 of the Penal
Law, popularly known as the Public Enemy Act.
17. The revision of the procedure for the appointment of lunacy commissions in criminal cases.
Obviously, work on all of these topics could not be completed for
the 1935 Legislature. Indeed, some were deemed to be matters which
could only be completed after long study. Of the subjects enumerated
above, inquiry is being continued as to contribution among joint tort
feasors, expert witnesses, the statutes of limitations, consideration
and the seal, and the revision of the Penal Law.
II
THE

1935

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Survival of Tort Actions 9
At the very outset, the topic of survival of tort actions was considered by the Law Revision Commission at the request of the Commission on the Administration of Justice." The maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" has been "characterized as barbarous by Sir
Frederick Pollock and has been tolerated in modem times only because it has been abolished in all fields of the law except that of personal injury." 2' At common law generally, causes of action in contract
'9 The recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 60 (E).
20N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. 13. The Commission on the Administration of Justice had recommended (1934) Sen. Int. No. 1788, Pr. No. 2126,
which failed of enactment. That Commission joined in recommending the Law
Revision Commission bill to the 1935 legislature, infra note 38.
21N. Y. LEG. Doc. (i935) No. 6o (B) p. 3. See POLLOCK ON ToRTs (i3ph ed.
1929) 68; note (1928) 13 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 596, 602.

420
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survived and causes of action in tort died.2 Since 1828, the statutes of
New York have provided for the survival of all contract actions 3 and
of tort actions for injuries to property rights.2 In 1847, a cause of
action for wrongful death was created in favor of the next of kin.2 No
action for personal injuries, however, survived either in favor of the
injured plaintiff's estate or against the estate of the deceased wrong2 61
doer.
The problem of changing the New York law resolved itself into two
questions: Should an action for personal injuries survive against the
estate of a deceased wrongdoer? Should an action for personal injuries
survive in favor of the estate of a deceased injured party?
Perhaps the more obvious injustice arose through the operation of
the New York law which abated actions for personal injuries when
the wrongdoer died. The frequency of mortalities in automobile accidents is notorious. When it is considered that in many cases the very
fatality to the neglig6nt person prevents any recovery by the wronged
person, the injustice of the rule is apparent. The injustice of the rule
by which causes of action abated by reason of plaintiff's death was
mitigated by Lord Campbel's Act.,6 a When the injured person died
not as a result of the injury itself, his cause of action for personal injuries died with him.
The Commission, therefore, decided that the common law rule of
abatement should be abolished. Great care, however, was necessary
to prevent a double recovery, first, for the unabated cause of action
for personal injuries, and second, for the cause of action given to the
next of kin under Lord Campbell's Act. A solution might have been
the requirement of an election between the cause of action for injury
and that for wrongful death. But such course might have met with
difficulties because of the express protection afforded the cause of
27
action for death by the New York Constitution.
Of course, it should be remembered that, in actions brought under
12N. Y. LEG. Doc. (935) No. 6o (E), pp. 16-24; note (1928) 13 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY

596; Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258,

259 (1885); 2 CARMODY, NEW

YORK PRACTICE (1930) § 762.
23N. Y. REv. STAT. (1838) pt. 2,

c. 6, tit. 5, § 2. See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (i935)
No. 60 (E), p. 24.
2N. Y. REv. STAT. (1838) pt. 2, c. 6, tit. 5, § 5. See also N. Y. REv. STAT. (1838)
pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 3, §§ 1, 2. See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (E), p.
2
5L. 1847, c. 450, §§ 1, 2.
2N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 6o (E), pp. 3, 24-40.

24.

'6N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 130 et seq.
27N. Y. CONST, Art. I, § 18: "The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."
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the wrongful death statute, the proper parties plaintiff are the next of
kin;28 the benefits of any recovery are preserved for their personal
use. 29 On the other hand, under the usual survival statutes, the proper
party plaintiff is the estate of the deceased,3" and the benefits of any
recovery, subject to the claims of creditors, are distributed in the
same manner as other assets of the estate. 31 Moreover, in death actions, the measure of damages is pecuniary loss to the next of kin,
while under a survival statute, recovery usually has a broader scope.2
The Commission, leaving the wrongful death statutes unchanged,
met the possibility of a double recovery by providing that if the injury
causes death, recovery by reason of the survival statute shall be
limited to the damages accruing before death.3
Thus the Commission determined that public policy required the
survival of causes of action regardless of whether the injured party or
the wrongdoer died. As a consequence, when it drafted its bill, the
Commission provided that the cause of action for personal injuries
should survive the death of the negligent party; it also provided that
the cause of action, limited to damages accruing to deceased before
death, 4 should survive in favor of the decedent's estate. It also provided that no cause of action for damages caused by an injury to a
third person 5 should be lost because of the death of a third person."
The principal terms of the Commission's revised bill,37 which be28N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 130.
9

2 N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 133. See note

(I9O2) 15 HARV. L. REV. 854.
Schumacher, Rights of Action under Death and Survival Statutes (1924) 23
MiCH. L. REv. 114, 1I6. Note (193) 44HARV. L. REv. 980, 982-983.
3
lSupra note 30.
2N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAw § 132. See editorials, Elements of Damage in Death
Action, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 6, 7, 1935 at 656, 68o. It should be noted that by L.
1935, C. 224, the scope of recovery in death actions was extended to include funeral
and medical expenses.
2N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (E), pp. 8-9. Thus the estate of the injured
party may recover for medical expenses, loss of wages, and damages for pain and
suffering, etc., accruing before death.
4Supra note 33.
uA common situation in which this principle would operate is the action
brought by parent or husband for loss of services, etc., in cases of personal injury.
wN. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) 60 (E) p. 6.
37
As originally introduced in the Legislature, the bill proposed by the Law Revision Commission excluded generally from its survival provisions causes of
action for breach of promise to marry, seduction, alienation of affections, and criminal conversation. The tripartite nature (e. g. in seduction, the parent, daughter
and seducer) of seduction, alienation of affections and criminal conversation
raised the question of whether the death of the third person not a party to the
suit should cause the action to abate. The Commission thought that as a general
matter no cause of action for damages caused by an injury to a third person
30
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came law, merit quotation. 38 As a substitute for section 118 of the
Decedent Estate Law, a new section was framed to read as follows:
"Actions against executors or administratorsfor injury to person
or property. No cause of action for injury to person or property
shall be lost because of the death of the person liable for the
injury. For any injury an action may be brought or continued
against the executor or administrator of the deceased person,
butpunitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury. This section shall extend to a cause of action for
wrongfully causing death and an action therefor may be brought
or continued against the executor or administrator of the person
liable therefor."
The new section i I9of the Decedent Estate Law reads as follows:
"Actions by executors or administratorsfor injury to person or
property. No cause of action for injury to person or property
shall be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor
the cause of action existed. For any injury an action may be
brought or continued by the executor or administrator of the
deceased person, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor
penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury. No cause of action for damages caused
by an injury to a third person shall be lost because of the death
of the third person."
The substitute section 120 of the Decedent Estate Law provides:
"Limitations upon recovery where injury causes death. Where an
injury causes the death of a person the damages recoverable for
such injury shall be limited to those accruing before death, and
shall not include damages for or by reason of death. The damages recovered shall form part of the estate of the deceased.
"Nothing herein contained shall affect the cause of action
existing in favor of the next of kin under section one hundred
and thirty of this chapter. Such cause of action and the cause of
action in favor of the estate to recover damages accruing before
death may be prosecuted to judgment in a single action; a separate verdict, report or decision shall be rendered as to each cause
of action.
"Where an action to recover damages for personal injury has
been brought, and the injured person dies before verdict, report
should be lost because of the death of the third person. (Supra note 36.) In accordance with this determination of policy, it was provided, even in the cast of
these otherwise disfavored actions, that the cause of action should not abate by
reason of the death of the third person. When the McNaboe bill (L. 1935, c. 263)
abolishing these actions became law, the Commission's bill was amended in the
legislature so as to omit all express reference to these actions.
38
Ass. Int. No. 1878, Pr. No. 2089, passed Assembly March 14, 1935, amended
in Senate April IO, 3935, amendments concurred in by Assembly April II, 1935.
Approved by the Governor May 8, 1935 as L. 1935, c. 795-
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or decision and his death is due to the injury, his executor or
administrator may enlarge the complaint in such action to include the cause of action for wrongful death pursuant to section
one hundred and thirty of this chapter.
"Where an action to recover damages for personal injury sustained before the death of the injured person and a separate
action for wrongful death pursuant to section one hundred and
thirty of this chapter are pending against the same defendant,
they may be consolidated on motion of either party."
Finally, 39 section 89 of the Civil Practice Act was refrained as
follows':
"Non-abatement after verdict, report or decision. After verdict,
report or decision in an action to recover damages upon a cause
of action which does not survive the death of a party, the action
does not abate by the death of either party, but the subsequent
proceedings are the same as in a case where the cause of action
survives. In case said verdict, report or decision is reversed, said
action does not abate by the death of either party, but no punitive damages shall be awarded nor penalies adjudged in any
subsequent new trial."
The Law Relating to Perjury0
Another problem which the Commission considered was the necessity for revising the perjury statutes. The breakdown in the enforcement of the law against perjury had become notorious. For many
years, remedial bills had been introduced into the Legislature. The
Commission on the Administration of Justice considered this question as one of its major problems, and framed bills aiming to correct
the shortcomings of the law. 4' These proposals failed of enactment.
Nevertheless, the urgency of remedying a vicious defect in the law
39

Other changes were made in § lO9 of the INSURANCE LAW and § 94 (k) of the
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW. These changes were made for the purpose of assuring the inclusion in insurance policies of provisions whereby the death of assured
would not release the company from liability to the assured or the injured person.
40
The recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (F).
41(1934) Sen. Int. No. 463, Pr. No. 476. The features of this bill were: two
degrees of perjury were created; first degree perjury was a felony and consisted
of a material false swearing in a felony prosecution; second degree perjury was a
misdemeanor and consisted of any other false swearing, whether material or not.
This bill was not reported out of the Senate Committee on Codes. Also (934)
Sen. Int. No. 464, Pr. No. 477 would have empowered courts of record to punish
,perjury as contempt of court. This bill passed the Senate, but was not reported
out of the Assembly Judiciary Committee. Note, however, that L. 1935, c. 760,
enacting a new article 45 of the CviL PRACTICE ACT, with regard to supplementary proceedings, in section 788, makes material false swearing therein punishable
as a civil contempt of court.
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remained. The sanctity of the oath is a pillar of the administration of
justice. Widespread prevalence of false swearing in judicial proceedings is a serious threat. Recognizing the vital importance of this
problem the Law Revision Commission undertook the study of
perjury.
One of the chief obstacles to the successful enforcement of the law
was the requirement that false swearing, to constitute perjury,
must relate to a "material matter".42 This requirement seems to have
crept into the law through a misconception first engendered by Lord
Coke, 43 and was subsequently introduced into the New York statute. 4 Although in England the courts had largely whittled away the
requirement of materiality, judicial decision in this state continued to
give vitality to this technicality. The case of People v. Teal45 gave the
word "material" such wide interpretation as to make proof of any
charge of perjury difficult ;45 and notwithstanding that later decisions
of the Court of Appeals in time47 departed from the rule of the Teal
4N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1620; N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (F), pp. 43 et seq.
43N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (F), pp. 9-23. Perhaps the basis of this misconception was the fact that originally the theory of the statute of Elizabeth
(5 Eliz. c. 9) showed an intention to make amends to the person injured by the
perjury. Thus if no one was grieved, the perjury was not "material" in the sense
of "substantial" and was thought not to be a crime. Logically, if a false swearing
caused no damage, it was, in that sense, immaterial. When the conception of
criminal law broadened so that the protection of the public rather than private
retribution became its principal aim, the origin of the element of materiality was
forgotten.
44
Supra note 42.
11196 N. Y. 372 (1909).
4'Teal was indicted for an attempt to suborn perjury in a divorce action, the
complaint in which charged adultery in Canada in 19o5. Teal attempted to procure a witness to swear to the commission of adultery in New York in 19o8. In
reversing the conviction, the Court of Appeals, by a four to three decision, held:
"Thus we see that the traversable issue of record was whether Gould had
committed adultery in a Canadian brothel in 19o5, and that the false testimony solicited from MacCauslan was designed to show a separate and distinct act of adultery not referred to in the complaint, committed by Gould
in the city of New York in the year 19o8. The bare statement of these facts,
unrelated both in pleading and in circumstance, is sufficient to draw attention sharply to the utter irrelevancy, incompetency and immateriality of
the false testimony solicited, to the issue tendered by the complaint in Gould
v. Gould...
"From time immemorial the common law has made the materiality of
false testimony an essential ingredient of the crime of perjury. From their
earliest beginnings our statutes have always embodied that rule. Our penal
laws, but recently recodified, have continued it. That, in short, is the unquestioned law of this state. (Penal Code, sec. 96; Penal Law, sec. 1620).
The language of the statute is that a person who wilfully and knowingly
testifies falsely, in any materialmatter, is guilty of perjury." (Italics court's).
4
7N.

Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (F), pp.

47-52.
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case, the lower courts continued to give broad application to the
48
term.
Another cause for the breakdown in the enforcement of the law
against perjury was the possibility of disproportionate punishment
49
under the Penal Law.
Accordingly, the Commission framed the bill, now the law,5" by
which perjury is defined:
"§ 1620. Perjurydefined. A person is guilty of perjury who I.
Swears or affirms that he will truly testify, declare, depose or
certify, or that any testimony, declaration, deposition, certificate, affidavit or other writing by him subscribed is true, in, or
in connection with, any action or special proceeding, hearing
or inquiry, or on any occasion in which an oath is required by
law or is necessary for the prosecution or defense of a private
right or for the ends of public justice or may lawfully be administered, and who in such action or proceeding or on such
hearing, inquiry or other occasion wilfully and knowingly testifies, declares, deposes or certifies falsely or states in his testimony, declaration, deposition, affidavit or certificate any matter
to be true which he knows to be false; or
"2. Swears or affirms that any deposition, certificate, affidavit
or other writing by him subscribed, is true, and which contains
any matter which he knows to be false affecting the title to any
real or personal property, including the assignment or satisfaction of a mortgage, and upon which reliance is placed; or
"3. Having been appointed or designated to be an interpreter
in any judicial action or proceeding knowingly and wilfully falsely interprets any material evidence, matter or thing between a
witness and the court or a justice thereof in the course of an
action or special proceeding."
The new statute created two degrees of perjury. Perjury in the first
degree is defined:
"A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree who commits
perjury as to any material matter in or in connection with any
action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or any hearing or
inquiry involving the ends of public justice or on an occasion
in which an oath or affirmation is required or may lawfully be
administered."
41N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 6o (F), pp. 52-57.
4
1The maximum penalty under the statute was twenty years. N. Y. PENAL
LAW §. 1633, before amendment, supra note 46. "Crimes are more effectively
prevented by the certainly than the severity of punishment." BECARRIA, AN
ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (2nd American ed. 1819) C. 27, entitled Of
the Mildness of Punishments, p. 93.
5'(1935) Ass. Int. No. 1879, Pr. No. 2090, 2759, passed Assembly March 27,
1935, passed Senate March 27, 1935, approved by the Governor April 3o, 1935 as
L. 1935, c. 632.
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Perjury in the second degree is defined as follows:
"Perjury in the second degree. A person is guilty of perjury
in the second degree who commits perjury under circumstances
not amounting to perjury in the first degree."
Similar changes were made with regard to the definition of the crime of
subornation of perjury.5' Both degrees of perjury and subornation of
perjury are made felonies.12 Thus; both degrees of the crime are triable
by jury in all parts of the state. It is also possible for a jury upon an
indictment for first degree perjury to convict for the lesser offense.2
A comparison of the new statute with the old reveals that the definition of perjury in the first degree is substantially the same as the
former definition of perjury. Perjury in the second degree, under the
new statute, is, however, a redefinition of the crime with the element
of materiality omitted. Another important change is the drastic
reduction of penalties. Instead of the maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years under the old statute, the maximum penalty for
first degree perjury is now only two years imprisonment or $5,000 fine
or both.r
Amendments to the Sales Act to Give Full Negotiabilityto Documents
of Title55
The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in proposing the Sales Act, incorporated a rule of limited negotiability for
documents of title. 6 The Uniform Sales Act as enacted in New York
provided that:
"the Ivalidity of the negotiation of a negotiable document of
title is not impaired by the fact that the negotiation was a breach
of duty on the part of the person making the negotiation or by
the fact that the owner of the document was induced by fraud,
mistake or duress to entrust the possession or custody thereof
to such person if the person to whom the document was negotiated or a person to whom the document was subsequently negotiated paid value therefor, without
notice of the breach of
57
duty, or fraud, mistake or duress."
On June 6, i9xi, New York adopted the Uniform Bills of Lading
51N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1632, 1632 (a), as amended supra note 50.
52N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1633, as amended supra note 50.
3N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 444; N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) 60 (F), p. 4.
54
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1633, as amended supra note 50.

UThe recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG. Doc. (1935) No'. 60 (B).
5

6UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 32,38 (N. Y. PERS. PROP LAW §§ 113, 119).
5UNriFORm SALES ACT § 38 (N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 119). See also UNIFORm SALES ACT § 32 (N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § II3).
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Act, and on June 30, I9II, the Uniform Sales Act" Under the Sales
Act, as set forth above, a finder or a thief, as against the true owner,
could not pass good title, even to a bona fide purchaser for value, to abill of lading. Under the Bills of Lading Act, 59 however, the true
owner could be divested of his title by such transfer, and the Pomerene Interstate Bills of Lading Act was in the same terms." The language with regard to the negotiation of warehouse receipts6 was similar to the Bills of Lading Act.6 2 The conflict existing by virtue of these
divergent provisions has raised interesting questions as to what is the
prevailing rule in New York. 3 The Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws proposed amendments to make the Sales Act
conform to the Bills of Lading Act and the Warehouse Receipts
Act. 4 The Law Revision Commission, therefore, proposed to the 1935
Legislature that the following amendments to the Sales Act (as contained in the Personal Property Law) be adopted; the enactment of
these statutes has conformed this act to the others :65
1 113. Who may negotiate a document. A negotiable document of title may be negotiated by any person in possession of
the same, however such possession may have been acquired, if,
by the terms of the document, the bailee issuing it undertakes
to deliver the goods to the order of such person, or if at the time
of negotiation the document is in such form that it may be negotiated by delivery.
"§ iig. When negotiation not impaired. The validity of the
negotiation of a negotiable document of title is not impaired by
the fact that the negotiation was a breach of duty on the part
of the person making the negotiation, or by the fact that the
owner of the document was deprived of the possession of the same
by loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress, or conversion,
if the person to whom the document was negotiated or a person to whom the document was subsequently negotiated paid
value therefor, in good faith without notice of the breach of
58

The UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT was adopted by L. 1911, c. 248; and the
UNIFORm SALES ACT by L. 1911, c. 571.
UNiFoRm BILLS OF LADING ACT §§ 31, 38 (N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 217,
224).
649 U. S. C. A. §§ iD, 117.
61UNIFoIm WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT §§ 40, 47, as amended by National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1922. N. Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 124, 131 as amended by L. 1924, C. 215.
62
Supra note 59.
6See BOGERT, THE SALE OF GOODS IN NEW YORK (1912) § 113; 2 WILLISTON,
SALES, (2nd ed. 1924) § 414.
4N. Y. LEG. DOC. (1935) No. 6o (B), p. io.
'5(I935) Sen. Int. No. 1236, Pr. No. 1399, passed Senate March 14, 1935, passed
Assembly March 20, 1935, approved by Governor March 29, 1935 as L. 1935,
c. 337-
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duty, or loss, theft, fraud, accident, mistake, duress or conversion."
Amendment to the Sales Act and the Bills of Lading Act to Add a
6
Definition of Value as Including an Antecedent Debt
When in I9II the New York Legislature passed the Uniform Sales
Act and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, it omitted from them the
definition of value. Thus the New York rule that an antecedent debt
did not constitute value was left unchanged.6 7 Nevertheless, New
York had adopted in section 51 of its Negotiable Instruments Law the
definition of value recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws:
"Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value and is
deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or
at a future time."
In the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, too, New York adopted the
doctrine that value includes an antecedent debt. 68 In the Uniform

Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 9 the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,7 0 and
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act,7' the definition of value was also
given a broader scope.
For these variances within the body of the statutory law of New
York, there seemed to be no justification, and the failure to adopt the
definition of the Uniform Sales Act and of the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act left New York out of step with the law of other states with which
commerce is constantly carried on. The Law Revision Commission
therefore recommended that the following provision be added to
Section 156 (1) of the Personal Property Law (Sales Act):
"Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for money
or not, constitutes value where goods or documents of title are
taken either in satisfaction thereof or as a security therefor."
For the same reason, the following addition to Section 239 (1) of the

Personal Property Law (Bills of Lading Act) was proposed:
"Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. An antecedent or pre-existing obligation whether for
6The recommendations and studies of the Commission are published as N. Y.
Doc. (I935) No. 6o (A).
6 Coddington v. Bay, 5 Johns Ch. 54 (N. Y. I819) affd. 20 Johns 637 (N. Y.
1822); N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) 60 (A), pp. 9-12, 15-20.
6
N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § I42.
LEG.
7

'IN.Y.
70

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAw

§ 272.

N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 183.
71
Cf. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 5I (15) with N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW

§ 51 (7).
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money or not constitutes value where a bill is taken either in
satisfaction thereof or as security therefor."
Both of these proposals were embodied in a bill introduced into the
72
Legislature, which has become law.
Imputation of ContributoryNegligence of Parentsor Custodians to
73
Infants
In New York, the negligence of parents or custodians has been
heretofore imputed to an infant non sui juris so as to bar a recovery
for personal injuries by the infant against a third person. This rule
had its origin in a dictum in the case of Hartfield v. Roper,74 the first
case that enunciated the doctrine in any of the common law jurisdictions. Of all the states in the Union, only three besides New York
have adhered to the doctrine.75 It has been repudiated in England
and in at least thirty-five of the United StatesJ Even in New York,
the courts, straining to devise limitations and exceptions, have raised
a crazy superstructure upon its foundations. One of the limitations
was that where the infant had exercised as much care as an adult
could reasonably have been expected to exercise, the doctrine of imputed negligence could not be applied.7 7 An extreme example of the
contortions through which courts have gone to avoid the application
of this doctrine can be found in the case of Kupchinsky v. Vacuum Oil
Co. 7 8 In this case, the Appellate Division, to avoid a strict application of the doctrine, resorted to the artificiality of dividing into two
parts the conduct of the negligent custodian, who was driving the
injured child: his conduct as custodian, and his conduct as driver of
the vehicle. It held that negligent conduct as a driver could not be imputed to the infant. Only negligent conduct as custodian could be
imputed. The Commission, believing that the doctrine had no founda7'(1935) Ass. Int. No. 386, Pr. No. 2464, substituted for the Commission bill

(1935) Ass. Int. No. 1585, Pr. No. 1731, with which it was identical, passed by
the Assembly March 13, 1935, by the Senate March 25, 1935, and approved
by the Governor April 24, 1935, as L. 1935, c. 455.
"The recommendations and study of the Commission were published as N. Y.

LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (C).

7421 Wend. 61 5 (N. Y. 1839).

75
N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (C), p. 3. For collection of cases see N. Y.
LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (C), pp. 27-28, n. 31.
T
6For collection of cases, see N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (C), pp. 28-42,
n. 32-34.

77
1hl v. Forty-Second St. etc. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317 (1872). For collection
of cases, see N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 6o (C), pp. 18-22, n. 17.
78263 N. Y. 128, 188 N. E. 278 (1933) affirming 238 App. Div. 457, 265 N. Y.

Supp. x86 (2nd Dept. 1933).
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tion in logic or policy, recommended that article 5 of the Domestic
Relations Law be amended by adding the following new section,

7
which became law:

9

"Section 73. Negligence of parent or other custodian not imputed to infant. In an action brought by an infant to recover
damages for personal injury the contributory negligence of the
infant's parent or other custodian shall not be imputed to the infant."
Uniform CriminalExtradition Act"
Interstate crime has become a problem of baffling proportions. The
combined forces of the several states and the federal government
have found it difficult to cope with organized gangs operating from a
base over a radius of many states. The framers of the Federal Constitution contemplated the need of cooperation among states to assist
each state in the enforcement of its criminal laws. For this purpose,
Article IV, section 2, of the Federal Constitution directed:
"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State,
shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime."
Judicial interpretation of this provision as well as of the relevant
federal statutes confined the operation of the law of extradition to
those accused persons who had been in the demanding state at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime. Thus the term "fugitive
from justice" was given a restricted meaning. The modem exigencies
of the crime problem necessitate a broadening of the class of extraditable persons. For this purpose, and also to introduce uniformity in
this field, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
framed the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The proposed uniform
act was the basis of studies by the Law Revision Commission for
revision of the New York procedure relating to extradition. The Law
Revision Commission proposed a bill substantially in the same form
as the uniform act. In the main, the present New York practice was
retained. One of the most important innovations, however, was contained in the proposed section 834 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which would have permitted the extradition of an accused even
though he was not within the demanding state at the time of the
79(i935)

Ass. Int. No.

I912,

Pr. No.

2131,

passed Assembly March20,

1935,

passed Senate April 9, 1935, approved by Governor May 8, 1935 as L. 1935,
c. 796.
80
The recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG. Doc. ('935) No. 6o (D).
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perpetration of the crime. The constitutionality of this provision has
been questioned, 81 on the ground that Article IV, section 2, of the
Federal Constitution states the maximum limit of the power of extradition both for federal and state statutes. Proponents of the Uniform
Act hold that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrict
cooperation among the states to the particular situation envisaged in
the Constitution.
The bill proposed by the Law Revision Commission contained two
additional sections not found in the original draft proposed by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. One of these would permit
the extradition of a person, as a fugitive from justice, who involuntarily left the demanding state and is found within New York. The
situation contemplated might have arisen in the Hauptmann case,
had the New Jersey court acquitted Hauptmann and New York
demanded his return.12 Under the present law there is some question as
to whether extradition may be obtained by a state which itself has
previously extradited the person sought. Another change would permit an agreement by the Governor of New York to extradite a prisoner for trial on a charge punishable by death or life imprisonment, on
condition that the demanding state agree to return the person to New
York if he is acquitted or sentenced to lesser punishment. These proposals of the Commission, however, have failed to become law.ss
8

1N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (E), pp. 12-13. See Report of Committee on
Legislationof New York County Lawyers Association, March 7, 1933, reporting on
(i933) Ass. Int. No. 353, Pr. No. 354.
8
2N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (D), pp. 5, 57-58.
83(1935) Ass. Int. No. 1586, Pr. No. 1732, passed Assembly March 1I, 1935,
passed Senate April 2, 1935. The bill, however, was disapproved by the Governor
with the following veto message:
"This bill would amend the code of criminal procedure by repealing the
present provisions relating to extradition and enacting in lieu thereof the socalled uniform criminal extradition act with certain modifications.
"This bill in general codifies existing law. It contains, however, one radical
departure. It permits the extradition of a person who was not actually in
the demanding state at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. This
provision is found in Section 834 of the bill which reads:
" 'Extradition of persons not present in demanding state at time of
commission of crime. The governor of this state may also surrender, on
demand of the executive authority of any other state, any person in this
state charged in such other state in the manner provided in section eight
hundred and thirty-two with committing an act in this state or in a
third state intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive
authority is making the demand; and the provisions of this title, not
otherwise inconsistent, shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime
and had not fled therefrom.'
"I realize, of course, the good purpose that is sought to be achieved by the
provisions of this section, namely, the apprehension, trial and conviction of
real criminals. At the same time, however, I fear that the section is open to
the strong possibility of serious misuse and abuse. It might readily curtail
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Recovery of Damakes from Third Person for Injuries to Real
PropertyWhen the Ownership of the Real Propertyis Divided
Between Owners of One Present and One or More Future
Interests8
Under the former law of New York, a trespasser upon real property
might have been subjected to separate suits brought against him by
owners of possessory interests and owners of future interests. 5 It was
true also that the owner of the possessory interest might perhaps
have recovered the full damage inflicted on the fee simple ownership
of the affected land,86 but no adequate method of supervision of the
fund thus collected existed.8 7 It seemed unreasonable to bar the
reversioner from his action by such suit of the tenant, without requiring the joinder of the reversioner as a party to the suit. Finally, in the
event of separate suits brought by both reversioner and tenant, it
seemed likely that the trespasser would be forced to pay damages
really in excess of his wrong. s 8

t

freedom of speech and of the press and be the basis of persecution. Additional study should be given to this particular aspect of the problem.
"I regret that it is necessary to disapprove the many beneficial provisions
of the bill merely because of the implications of Section 834. But during the
next session of the Legislature I trust that another bill, containing proper
safeguards, will be passed.
"The bill is disapproved.
(Signed) HERBERT H. LEHMIAN"

84

The recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G). The studies contained in N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935)
No. 6o (G) were prepared under the direction of the Commission by Richard R.
Powell, Professor of Law, Columbia University. The study of this subject is
printed at pp. 37-44.
8N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 6o (G), pp. 38-39, n. 8 and 9. See N. Y. REAL
PROPERTY LAW § 531.
8
6Rogers v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 107 N. E. 661 (1915)
discussed in N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (G), pp. 39-40, n. IO.
87
N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G), p. 41 points out that nothing appears in
the appellate record or in the opinion in the Rogers case to show what, if any, protection of the rights of the remainderman was made. See also N. Y. LEG. Doc.
(I935) No. 60 (G), pp. 39-40, n.12.
88
See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 60 (G), pp. 43-44 as follows:
"When one or more of the persons thus suing separately has an estate for
life there is a further danger to the defendant. In determining the share of
damages recoverable by the owner of an estate for life, the duration of this
estate for life is a most important factor. Evidence as to this duration cannot
be other than evidence as to probabilities. To whatever extent actuarial data
are received and relied upon in computing the proper damages to be awarded,
the future course of events may depart widely from the probabilities used as
a basis of the award. Thus if A has damaged the fee simple ownership of
Blackacre to the extent of $5,ooo and Blackacre is owned by B, a life tenant
aged 3o,and by C who has a remainder in fee simple absolute, in the absence
of unusual circumstances, B would be entitled in his separate action to recover 76.86 per cent of the $5,ooo or a total of $3,843. Now let us suppose
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To meet the situation, the Law Revision Commission proposed to
the Legislature two bills which were enacted. 89 The first of these
added to the Real Property Law a new section 538 to read as follows:
"Recovery of fee damages by the owner of a possessory estatefor
life or for years. When the ownership of land is divided into a
possessory estate for life or for years and one or more future interests, and a person having none of these interests causes damage to such land, the damages recoverable by the owner of such
possessory interest from the wrongdoing third person may include damages caused to interests in the affected land other than
those owned by parties to the action or proceeding when, but
only when, all living persons who have either a possessory or a
future interest in the affected land are parties thereto. The court
in which any such recovery of damages occurs shall make such
direction for the distribution of the damages recovered among
the persons who are parties to the action or proceeding and
for the protection of the interests of persons who are not parties
thereto, as justice may require."
The second of these amended the Civil Practice Act to make effective the provisions of the new section 538 of the Real Property Law,
by adding the following new subdivision to Section 193 of the Civil
Practice Act:
"When the ownership of real property is divided into a possessory and one or more future interests; and a third person is
claimed to have caused damage to such real property; and an
that B has obtained his judgment and the wrongdoer A has paid it in full.
The next day B is killed in a street accident. C, who has thus far done nothing, becomes entitled to possession of Blackacre and thereby learns of A's
conduct. When C's suit is tried, the duration of B's estate for life is no longer
a future problem. Facts show it to be short and the damage to C's interest
to be almost the whole of the $5,000. Thus conceivably A can be compelled
to pay close to $8,8oo instead of the $5,ooo.
"The law ienot generally over-worried about a wrongdoer being subjected
to multiple bills of costs or to the risk that several partial verdicts will exceed
in amount a single complete verdict. These factors are here supplemented
by the further danger of excessive liability due to the difficulty of proof as
to the duration of life interests. Consequently it would seem reasonable to
permit a defendant in any action brought to recover damages to land, the
ownership of which is split between the owner of a present interest and one
or more future interests, to require the joinder of those living persons other
than the plaintiff who have any one of these other interests, so that the defendant's total liability can be determined at one time."
8
1The bill to amend the REAL PROPERTY LAW was (1935) Sen. Int. No. '598,
Pr. No. i868. It was amended and passed in Senate April 9, 1935, and as amended
passed Assembly April 12, I935. It was approved by the Governor on May 8,
1935 as L. 1935, c. 794. The bill to amend the CIvIL PRACTICE AcT was (1935)
Ass. Int.No. 1914, Pr. No. 2133. It was passed by the Assembly March i9, 1935,
and amended in the Senate and passed April 9, 1935, and the amendments were
concurred in by the Assembly April II, 1935. It was approved by the Governor
on May 8, 1935 as L. 1935, c. 798. These acts are made effective on September i,
1935.
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action or proceeding is pending in which less than all the owners
of such real property seek to recover the damages so caused to
their several or aggregated interests; and a person alleged to be
responsible for such damage makes application to the court to
have all living persons who have an interest present or future in
the affected real property made parties to such action or proceeding, the court must grant the application and direct such additional parties to be brought in by the proper amendment, but
the expense made necessary to accomplish the additional joinders
can be allocated to the applicant or to such other persons as to
the court shall seem proper. Any person thus made a party to the
action or proceeding shall be precluded from recovering the damages, if any, caused to his interest in such real property by conduct of the person on whose application he was made a party
otherwise than in such action or proceeding. If damages are recovered in such an action or proceeding, the court shall make
such direction for the distribution of the damages recovered
among the persons who are parties to the action or proceeding
and for'the protection of the interests of persons who are not
parties thereto, as justice may require."
Both of these amendments provide that the court shall-make such
direction as justice may require for the distribution of the damages
recovered among the persons who are parties to the action or proceeding and for the protection of the interests of persons who are not
parties thereto.
Treble Damages in Actions for Waste90
Sections 524 and 525 of the New York Real Property Law per-

petuated the old Statute of Gloucester, enacted in England in

1278.

These provisions declared that, in an action for waste, a person may
be liable for treble damages and forfeiture of his possessory interest in
the land upon which the act of waste was committed. Research
revealed that the Statute of Gloucester had not been used in England
over a period of fifty years, that it was repealed in effect in 1833, and
in fact in 1879. 1 Generally, when treble or punitive damages are
allowed, some element of malice or reprehensible tortious conduct is
involved.92 The Commission concluded that there was no public
policy to sustain the ancient rule and that it was incompatible with
the general rules of damages in actions for injuries to property. The
Commission recommended, therefore, that only compensatory
damages should be allowed in the action for waste, and that for90
The supporting study is presented in N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (G),
pp. 62-76.
91
N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G), p. 63.
12N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 60 (G), pp. 65-69 gives a collection of statutes
with comment.
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feiture of the possessory interest should be permitted only when the
resulting damage equals or exceeds the value of the possessory interest. This bill was passed by the Legislature and signed by the Gover93
nor.
Alteration of Premises as Waste; Ameliorating Waste14
Originally at common law, it was waste for a tenant in possession to
alter in any manner the subject of his tenancy. 5 New York modified
the common law rule by declaring it permissible for a tenant in possession to cut down trees upon his land when good husbandry made it
advisable.9 The common law was further modified by permitting a
tenant to change the course of a stream upon his land in the interests
of good husbandry.9 7 Later, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the tenant in possession could erect buildings upon unimproved
realty.' Despite these advances, however, the courts refused to
change the common law of waste in two situations of extreme importance in the modem development of real property. Tenants of
realty upon which structures had been erected could not make
structural changes dictated by contemporary necessities;99 nor could
tenants remove outmoded structures to erect new buildings.' These
rules make it possible for remaindermen or reversioners to withhold
consent to any change in the structures, for the purpose of forcing
exorbitant payments from tenants.
To remedy this defect, the Law Revision Commission proposed,
and the Legislature passed, the following new section 537 of the Real
Property Law:
"Alterations or replacements of structures by persons having
estatefor life or years. When land is in the possession of a person
having an estate for life or for years therein, and such person proposes to make an alteration in or replacement of a structure or
93(1935) Ass. Int. No. 1913, Pr. No.

passed Senate March

25,

2132,

passed Assembly March i, 1935,

1935, and was approved by the Governor on May 8,

1935 as L. 1935, c. 797.

"'The supporting study is printed in N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (G), pp.

45-61.
95N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G), p. 47.
96N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (G), pp. 52-53.
97N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G), p. 54.
"8N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G), pp. 54-55, n. 38. See N. Y. 0. and W. R.
v. Livingston, 238 N. Y. 300, 144 N. E. 5o (1924).

9N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (G), pp. 55-57.
"'0N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 60 (G), pp. 57-59, analyzing Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N. Y. Supp. 6 (1929), aff'd. without opinion, Finch J.
dissenting in strong opinion, 231 App. Div. 704, 245 N.Y. Supp. 402 (1930), affd.
without opinion 256 N. Y. 670 (1931).
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structures thereon, and the proposed alteration or replacement
is one which a prudent owner of an estate in fee simple absolute
in the affected land would be likely to make in view of the conditions existing on and in the neighborhood of the affected land;
then the owner of a future interest in such land can neither recover damages for, nor enjoin the alteration or replacement without establishing one or more of the following facts:
"i. That the proposed alteration or replacement, when completed, will reduce the market value of the future interest of
complainant; or
"2. That the person proposing to make the alteration or replacement refuses adequately to protect the complainant by the
giving of security against a cessation of the proposed work prior
to its completion and against responsibility for expenditures incident to the making of the proposed new construction; or
"3. That the proposed alterations or replacement are in violation of the terms of some agreement or other instrument regulating the behavior of the owner of the estate for life or for years
or restricting the land in question."
These proposals failed to become law for lack of the Governor's
10 1
approval.
Section 23o of the Correction Law'0'
Little known to the ordinary citizen is the Correction Law dealing
with the treatment of prisoners. Section 230 of the Correction Law
makes provision for reduction of prison sentences when good behavior
or good work of prisoners so warrants, a policy embodied in the law
since 1817.103 Article 9 of the Correction Law, however, of which
10'(i935) Ass. Int. No. i91O, Pr. No. 2129, passed Assembly March 20, 1935,
passed Senate March 25, 1935. This bill was disapproved by the Governor on
May 8, 1935 with the following memorandum:
"This bill provides that a tenant for life or for years may make an alteration in or replacement of a structure on the land, if such alteration or replacement is such which a prudent owner would be likely to make in view of
the existing conditions. The bill also prevents the-owner of the future interest in the land from recovering damages or preventing the alteration or
replacement unless he can prove that it win reduce the market value of his
interest, or that the person proposing to make the alteration or replacement
has refused adequately to secure the completion of the work and its payment,
or that the proposed changes are in violation of an express agreement.
"The provisions of this bill practically reverse existing law.
"I am in complete sympathy with the purpose that this bill seeks to
achieve. However, I have grave doubt as to the wisdom of placing the burden
of proof upon the person who has an interest in the property but who, at
the time, is not in possession; and likewise as to whether the bill should apply
to all tenancies for years without regard to duration. I regret that because of
this I am compelled to veto the bill.
"The bill is disapproved.
(Signed) HERBERT
H. LEHMAN"
102The recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG.
Doc. (I935) No. 60 (I).
10
L. 1817, c. 269.
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section 230 is a part, was enacted substantially in its present form
by the laws of 1886.104 Section 23o at that time was a simple, compact
provision containing graduated reductions depending on the length
of the sentence. Since i886, section 23o has undergone many changes.
These amendments, never retroactive in application, were made applicable only to those entering prison subsequent to each amendment.
The result was a stratification of prisoners into various classes, the
limits of which were determined by the dates of the changes. Thus
different provisions of the law making different allowances of time
applied to each of these classes, so that a prisoner in one group did
not receive the same reduction as prisoners in other groups. In 1934,
an attempt at a comprehensive restatement of the benefits of section
230 introduced greater confusion." 5 Because of phrasing which
seemed to make benefits cumulative, exorbitant expectations were
aroused on the part of the prisoners.0 6 Some of these expectations
were, in fact, realized by decisions of the courts and rulings of the
Attorney-General. 117 The constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto legislation raised a problem in any attempt at revision. Although
the application of "good time" statutes could be considered simply
advisory to the governor in the exercise of his constitutional power of
pardon and commutation, still there is some authority both in New
York and elsewhere for the proposition that prisoners were entitled
to appropriate good time allowances provided the conditions of the
statute were met. Regardless of the constitutional question, however,
the practical necessities of prison discipline demanded a prompt and
fair solution of the difficulties presented by the patchwork amendments to section 230.108 The Governor, therefore, requested the Law
Revision Commission to consider this problem and to report its recommendations to him. The Law Revision Commission, accordingly,
proposed to the Governor a statute which he referred to the Legislature with his message.
This bill emphasized the fact that "good time" allowances are
simply an aid to the Governor in the exercise of his constitutional
power of pardon and commutation. The principal changes proposed
y the Law Revision Commission are as follows:
"Definite sentence; indeterminate sentence; discretionaryreduction of sentence. i. A sentence to imprisonment in a state prison
for a definite fixed period of time is a definite sentence. A sentence
104L. 1886, c. 21.

"OIL. 1934, c. 731. See N. Y. LEG. Doc. (x935) No. 6o (I), pp.
206N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (I), pp. 3, 18-22.
117N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (I), pp. 20-21, 87.
108N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (I), pp. 4, 46-47.
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to imprisonment in a state prison having minimum and maximum limits fixed by the court or the governor is an indeterminate
sentence.
"2. Every prisoner confined in a state prison or penitentiary
may in the discretion of the governor as hereinafter provided receive, for good conduct and efficient and willing performance of
duties assigned, a reduction of his sentence not to exceed ten
days for each month of the minimum term in the case of an indeterminate sentence, or of the term as imposed by the court
in the case of a definite sentence. The maximum reduction allowable under this provision shall be four months per year, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to confer any right whatsoever upon any prisoner to demand or require the whole or any
part of such reduction."
Certain changes in other sections of the Correction and Penal
Laws were made necessary because of the adoption of new terminology. I° 9 The entire proposal of the Commission became law." 0
In addition to these proposals, passed by the legislature, the Commission proposed two bills which passed the Senate but failed to be
reported out of committee in the Assembly. One would adopt for
construction of deeds the same principle of implication of cross
remainders now applied to wills."' Another proposal, seeking to ac-2
complish what has been characterized as the "liquidity of land","
aimed to liberalize those sections of the real property law prescribing
the procedure for the sale, lease or mortgage of real property held in
3
trust or subject to future interests."
III
STUDIES NOT LEADING TO LEGISLATION

In addition to the recommendations outlined in the preceding pages
which resulted in bills presented to the legislature, the Commission
undertook certain studies not resulting in proposals for change.
' 09The principal change in terminology was the substitution of the phrase
"discretionary reduction of sentence" for the old terms "commutation or diminution of sentence", "compensation or diminution of sentence", "compensation,"
and "commutation".
n0Ass. Int. No. igo9, Pr. No. 2128, passed Assembly April 2, 1935, passed
Senate April 18, 1935, approved by the Governor May 14, 1935 as L. 1935, ch.
902.

"'The supporting study of the Commission is printed in N. Y. LEG. Doc.
(1935) No. 60 (G), pp. 77-86.
UPowell, The Liquidity of Land (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 989.
"'The supporting study of the Commission is printed in N. Y. LEG. Doc.
(1935) No. 6o (G), pp. 11-36.
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In certain of these projects, the Commission reached the conclusion
that no change was desirable. Its study of the doctrine of incorporation by reference as applied to wills was among these. The general
rule in England and the United States has been thus expressed:
"If a will, executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself by reference any document or paper not so
executed and witnessed, whether the paper referred to be in the
form of a will or codicil, or of a deed or indenture, or of a mere
list or memorandum, the paper so referred to, if it was in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is identified by
clear and satisfactory proof as the paper referred to therein, takes
effect as4 part of the will, and should be admitted to probate as
such."11
Although the New York courts have expressed certain doubts as to
the general operation of the doctrine, the Commission concluded that
clarification of the problem could best be left to the courts and that
legislation was not desirable. 15,
In response to a suggestion by a member of the bar, the Commission undertook to study section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law to
ascertain the adequacy of remedies for the evaluation of realty in the
distribution of estates. Whether the spouse alone takes or whether
other distributees are entitled to a share may, of course, depend on the
value of the realty. The study made under the Commission's direction disclosed that there were at least four possible procedures already
6
available in the New York practice for this purpose."
The subject of an infant's right to recover for prenatal injuries has
been a storm center in legal literature." 7 In New York, the case of
Drobner v. Peters,"" denying a recovery to an infant for injuries
received while en ventre sa mere, has been the focal point of this discussion. After study of the problem, the Commission decided to make
no recommendation for legislation.
"'Gray, C. J., in Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, i3o Mass. 91 (1881).
n'rThe supporting study of the Commission is N. Y. LEG. Doc. ('935) No. 6o
(G), pp. 87-104. See especially p. io4.

'The supporting study of the Commission is N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o
(J). See especially pp. 6-12, discussing the statutory action to compel the determination of a claim to real property (N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 500512), the procedure provided by § 242 of the N. Y. SURROGATE'S COURT ACT,
the procedure provided by statute, called "probate of heirship" (N. Y. SURRoGATE'S CouRT ACT §§ 311-313), as well as an action of ejectment.
"7 See collection of legal periodical literature contained in N. Y. LEG. Doc.
(i935) No. 6o (H), pp. 26-28, n. 75.
"82 3 2 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567, 2o A. L. R. 1503 (1921) reversing 194 App.
Div. 696, 186 N. Y. S. 278 (1st Dept. 1921).

440

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

On another category of work undertaken by the Commission, consisting of projects not completed before the end of the 1935 session of
the legislature, no definite commentary beyond mere mention can
now be made. The New York law as to contribution among joint tort
feasors n 9 and the procedure with regard to the production of expert
testimony12 are subjects within the class of unfinished business.
Likewise a thorough study of the statutes of limitations is in progress.' 2' Among the matters being considered in this latter field are
the rules relating to the extension of the limitation period because of
disabilities, and the provisions regarding nonresidents and tolling. A
complete fundamental examination of the doctrine of consideration
and of the seal is also being made. 22 Finally, the Law Revision Commission is making a study of the necessities for reform of the Penal
Law.ln Not only among students of the subject and those immediately
interested in the criminal law and its enforcement, but also in the
public at large, there is growing opinion that a thoroughgoing revision of the Penal Law of New York is long overdue. 24 The Law
Revision Commission, responsive to this general feeling, is making a
long term exploratory study of this part of the law.
The Commission's work has also taken another course that promises additional valuable public service. Several studies have been
made by the Commission directly at the request of the Governor.
The work done on the revision of section 230 of the Correction Law,
to which reference has already been made,12 5 illustrates this type of
nON. Y. LEG. Doc.

(1935) No. 60, p. ii.
LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. ii.
EN. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o,pp. 11-12.
mN. Y. LEG. Doc. (i935) No. 6o, p. 13. It is interesting to note that by L.
,935, c. 7o8 (effective Sept. 1,1935) § 342 of the CIviL PRACTICE AcT was amended

12N. Y.

to read as follows:
§342. Seal on written instrument as evidence of consideration. A seal
upon a written instrument hereafter executed shall not be received as conclusive, or presumptive evidence of a sufficient consideration. A written instrument, hereafter executed, which modifies, varies or cancels a sealed
instrument, executed prior to the effective date of this section, shall not be
deemed invalid or ineffectual because of the absence of a seal thereon."
mN Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, p. 12. See also N. Y. LEG. Doc. ( 934) No.
50, pp. 45-48 for the recommendations of the Commission on the Administration
of Justice. See also N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I934) No. 50 (Q), (R), (S)for work done
under the direction of that Commission. See also MacDonald, The Classificalion
of Crimes (1933) 18 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 524.
mSee Presentment of New York County Grand Jury of May 1934, N. Y.
Times Jan. 21, 1935. See also President Roosevelt's letter to the 1935 meeting
of the American Law Institute, N. Y. Times, May io, 1935.

mSupra, pp. 436-438.
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service. On request of the Governor, a thorough study was also made
of certain proposals seeking to effect innovations in the procedure for
appointing lunacy commissions.'26 These proposals had been embodied
in bills introduced into the Legislature in 1933 and 1934.27 The gist
of one of these proposals was that each lunacy commission appointed
pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure should
include a "qualified psychiatrist". Another of these proposals related to enacting a suitable definition of the term "qualified psychiatrist" as well as providing a method for registering this class of medical experts. The Commission decided that a change in the law along
the line of this last proposal was desirable. Investigation, however,
disclosed grave practical difficulties, making it inadvisable to require
the appointment of "qualified psychiatrists" on all lunacy commissions. For one thing, such mandatory statute would impose a hardship upon rural communities in which it might be difficult to obtain
the services of a psychiatrist. 12 8 As a matter of policy, too, there was
objection to that part of the proposal which would permit the use of
psychiatrists connected with institutions in which the subject had
been confined. 2 9
The Commission was also asked by the Governor to consider the
possibility of reinforcing the provisions of Section 722, subdivision ii,
of the Penal Law, commonly known as the "public enemy act".
Widespread discussion in the press"0 and much public interest was
aroused by this matter. The present provisions of the "public enemy
act" declare that a misdemeanor has been committed when a person
"bears an evil reputation and with an unlawful purpose consorts
with thieves and criminals or frequents unlawful resorts"." The
proponents of a more drastic "public enemy" law maintained that
the requirement of "unlawful purpose" made Section 722 unenforce"0 The recommendations and study of the Commission are published as N. Y.
LEG. Doc. (i935) No. 6o (L).
127(1934) Sen. Int. No. 1662, Pr. No. 1938; (1933) Sen. Int. No. 623, Pr. No. 638.
12N.Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 6o (L), pp. 29-3o.
"2N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (L), pp. 30-31.
1"'See editorials in N. Y. World Telegram, Feb. I I, 1935; N. Y. Herald Tribune,
Feb. 28, I935; N. Y. Times, Review of the Week, Mar. 3, 1935; N. Y. Post, April
10, 1935; N. Y. L. J., Dec. 26, 27, 1934 at 2556, 2574. See also Correspondence
in N. Y. L. J., Mar. 5,1935 at 113o; N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) 6o (K), p. 36.
"'This act is subdivision iIof § 722 of N. Y. PENAL LAW, which reads:
"§ 722. Disorderly Conduct. Any person who with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned,
commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the
offense of disorderly conduct...
"Ii.Is engaged in some illegal occupation or who bears an evil reputation
and with an unlawful purpose consorts with thieves and criminals or fre-

quents unlawful resorts."
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able. Several schemes of amendment were put forward. The effect of
each of these vould have been to circumvent the "unlawful purpose"
requirement or eliminate it.132 The Commission, however, took the
broad stand that any such legislation was highly undesirable for
reasons both of constitutionality and of public policy. It affirmed its
belief that there was no short cut to the proper enforcement of the
criminal law,ss in the arrest and prosecution of persons for serious
crimes which they are "known" to have committed.
IV
CONCLUSION

The bound studies'34 of the Commission are the published record
of its achievement. It is a record that should be of great value in the
explanation of the new laws adopted on the Commission's recommendation. Not only has the Commission illustrated that it may be a
medium for effecting "demands not yet articulate" ;13 it has opened a
broad vista of what may be achieved by thorough, disinterested,
continuous, scholarly study of the legal structure.
13N. Y. LEG. Doc. (I935) No. 6o (K), pp. 27-33.

13N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (K), p. 5. See also entire recommendations
and supporting study printed in N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o (K). A public
enemy bill, however, Ass. Int. No. 463, Pr. No. 473,2976,was passed bythe Legislature, effective for one year only, and was signed by the Governor on May I5,
1935 as L. 1935, c. 921, with the following memorandum:
"This bill amends Section 722 of the Penal Law which relates to disorderly
conduct. The amendment adds a provision that in any prosecution the fact
that the defendant is engaged in an illegal occupation or bears an evil reputation and is found consorting with persons of like evil reputation, thieves
or criminals, shall be prima facie evidence that such consorting was for an
unlawful purpose.
"Concerning the provisions of this bill, there is a sincere difference of opinion. Some contend that the bill is unconstitutional; others that it is constitutional. Many police commissioners and prosecutors assert that the bill
would be very effective in aiding them in enforcing the provisions of Section
722. Others state it would be of little value in prosecution. Still others believe
that the provisions of the bill are open to the danger of serious abuse.
"The fact is that this bill will remain in effect for only one year. I think it
is reasonable that we should have an actual trial of the practical application
of the provisions of this bill."
"1'Printedin N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1935) No. 6o, 6o (A) to (L). By joint resolution
of the legislature, these studies will comprise one bound volume entitled REPORT,
REcOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF TEE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, 1935.

UsSupra note ii.

